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As the second part of the treatise “A General Theory of Concept Lattice”, this paper speaks of
the tractability of the general concept lattice for both its lattice structure and logic content. The
general concept lattice permits a feasible construction that can be completed in a single scan of the
formal context, though the conventional formal-concept lattice and rough-set lattice can be regained
from the general concept lattice. The logic implication deducible from the general concept lattice
takes the form of µ1 → µ2 where µ1, µ2 ∈M∗ are composite attributes out of the concerned formal
attributes M . Remarkable is that with a single formula based on the contextual truth 1η one can
deduce all the implication relations extractable from the formal context.
For concreteness, it can be shown that any implication A → B (A,B being subsets of the formal
attributes M) discussed in the formal-concept lattice corresponds to a special case of µ1 → µ2 by
means of µ1 =
∏
A and µ2 =
∏
B. Thus, one may elude the intractability due to searching for
the Guigues-Duquenne basis appropriate for the implication relations deducible from the formal-
concept lattice. Likewise, one may identify those µ1 → µ2 where µ1 = ∑A and µ2 = ∑B with the
implications that can be acquired from the rough-set lattice. (Here, the product
∏
stands for the
conjunction and the summation
∑
the disjunction.)
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1. INTRODUCTION
The general concept lattice (GCL) [1] is a novel structure that brings together the formal-concept lattice (FCL) [2–4]
and the rough-set lattice (RSL) [5–8] on a common theoretical foundation. The GCL accomplishes the categorisation
of whatever discernible object sets into general extents according to the general intents, which are whatever features
the general extents can possess. The general intent can be represented by the pair of the generalised formal-concept
property (Gfcp) and the generalised rough-set property (Grsp), which are respectively the generalisations for the
intents of FCL and of RSL [1]. There are well known challenges both for the construction of lattice [9, 10] and for
extracting the logic content in FCL [3, 11–17]. In this paper, one will show that the GCL is free from such intractability
problems, the GCL is in practice much easier to handle than the FCL and RSL. To begin with, a remarkable principle
that leads to the GCL is that the information content revealed by the formal context F (G,M) should not be specific
to the particular choice of formal attribute set M . In effect, the possible property characterisations for the objects may
run over the generalised attribute set M∗. Hence, by consistency, the GCL turns out to depend on the extended formal
context F ∗(G,M∗), see Lemma 2.8 in Ref. [1], since F ∗(G,M∗) is the direct consequence of F (G,M). Intriguingly,
despite the enormous increase of attribute freedom, owing to the extension from M to M∗, one finds that the problem
treatment is much simplified. Here, an interpretation for the GCL to be manageable is that F ∗(G,M∗) unveils
additional instructive relations which are not accessible otherwise. Clearly, such instructive relations can by no means
be observed in the FCL and the RSL that only refer to F (G,M).
In Section 2, one will clarify the technical origin why GCL is tractable both in constructing the lattice structure and
in implementing the logic content. Basically, the GCL comprises 2nF nodes (general formal concepts) characterising
all the distinct object classes (general extents) discernible by the formal context, see Proposition 3.4 and 3.5 of
Ref. [1], thus, the efforts in deciding which object class is categorised are in fact inessential. Further, it will also
become obvious that the identifications for the general intents in fact exhaust all the |M∗| generalised attributes. In
effect, corresponding to each general extent X ∈ EF , see Proposition 3.5 and Proposition 3.6 of Ref. [1], the general
intent amounts to the closed interval [X]F = {µ ∈M∗ | µR = X} = [η(X), ρ(X)], which has the upper bound ρ(X)
(Grsp) and the lower bound η(X) (Gfcp). Note that the whole generalised attribute set M∗ is then divided into 2nF
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2non-overlapping general intents on the GCL, in contrast to the cases for FCL and RSL where attributes in M can
be repeatedly used for the intents. Therefore, it is a simplicity to determine the general intents since each of them
appears to be a unique closed interval up to its bounds, which are ordered according to Galois connection. Moreover,
one notices that the complexity in determining all the bounds can still be halved by virtue of the conjugateness
relation of Proposition 3.7 in Ref. [1]. Remarkable is also that the the non-overlapping of general intents facilitates
the implementations of logic implications. The idea, relating two attributes pertaining to two general intents whose
general extents are ordered via set-inclusion relations by an implication, maps to the extraction of implications from
the FCL [11] and RSL. On the other hand, the logic content of GCL are then clarified by means of the simple
equivalence among attributes grouped into the same general intent since the equivalent attributes are the property of
the same object class.
Sec. 3 is devoted to the practical aspect in determining the GCL’s lattice structure. Unlike Ref. [1], one instead
adopts the disjunctive normal form (DNF) for Gfcp and the conjunctive normal form (CNF) for Grsp. It will
be demonstrated that the GCL subject to the formal context is characterised by a simple η-representation or ρ-
representation which is obtained after one single glance over the formal context. From the η- or ρ-representation one
may read out the general intent for any given general extent in EF . Every nF -bit binary string BX can then be
employed to encode a general formal concept as (X, ρ(X), η(X)) = (X, [BX ]ρ, [BX ]η). The construction of GCL is
thus as tractable as grouping the objects according to attributes in the formal context. One will also demonstrate
that both the FCL and RSL can be rediscovered from the GCL as particular cases: The FCL categorises those object
classes which are expressible in terms of an intersection of mRs for some ms in M where the whole object collection
G is also regarded as an FCL extent, cf. e.g. Ref. [2]; the RSL categorises those object classes given in terms of a
union of mRs for some ms in M where the empty object set ∅ is also regarded as an RSL extent, cf. e.g. Ref. [8].
In Sec. 4, an implication relation discussed in the frame of GCL is considered between two different attributes,
say µ1 → µ2, which can be intuitively mapped onto the contextual Venn diagram (Definition 2.9 of Ref. [1]), giving
rise to the set inclusion relation µR1 ⊆ µR2 . Interestingly, the relation A→B (A ⊆ M,B ⊆ M) developed from FCL
[11], i.e. A
fcl→ B, appears to be a special case of the logic implication from GCL. Likewise, one may also recognise
the relation A
rsl→ B, which is the one that could have been developed from RSL, as a special case of the GCL-based
rules of implication. It is noteworthy that the logic implication arising from the GCL can be deduced from one
single formula depending on the contextual truth 1η, see Definition 2.5 of Ref. [1]. Remarkably, one may then forgo
the prevalent process of finding pseudo-intents for the construction of the minimal implication bases, the so-called
Guigues-Duquenne bases or stem bases [3, 11–17]. Not to mention that there are still implication relations deducible
from the GCL which can be neither identified with A
fcl→ B nor with A rsl→ B.
2. GENERALITY VERSUS TRACTABLITY
Following the convention of the previous work, the formal context is denoted as F (G,M), where G represents the
formal objects and M represents the formal attributes. The fundamental operation R defines the map from an object
element to an attribute subset and from an attribute element to an object subset:
g ∈ G 7→ gR ∈ 2M (m ∈M 7→ mR ∈ 2G), (1)
based on which the derivation operators I, and ♦ are given by Eq. (4)-(6) and (8) of Ref. [1]. Note that the treatment
of objects and attributes are formally different. The objects are distinct entities while the attributes can overlap per
conjunction, a point of view giving rise to the formal context extension from F (G,M) to F ∗(G,M∗) (Lemma 2.8 of
Ref. [1]). However, there are then two distinct formal contexts to be considered subject to the same data structure
[8], as are exemplified and explained in Table I. Now that if a set of given parameters is regarded as objects it can no
more be regarded as attributes and vice versa, it remains an open question whether or how the both formal contexts
can co-exist in the same treatment, in what follows one will concentrate on a definite choice of objects and attributes.
Since the GCL makes reference on F ∗(G,M∗), it is intriguing whether the problem complexity of GCL can be
reduced despite the domain extension from M to M∗. To this end, it is rather instructive to take into account two
ordering systems one may establish among attributes. Without loss of generality, one could assume that no constraint
has been pre-imposed on the given attribute set M . As the first ordering system, one then ends up the conventional
Venn diagram V0M , which is divided into 2|M | disjoint regions in the sense that no pair of attributes in M has an empty
intersection. Moreover, as the second ordering system, the contextual Venn diagram VFM (Definition 2.9 in Ref. [1])
is employed to govern the attribute relations inferred from the formal context. In Fig. 1, the nF disjoint regions on
VFM correspond to the nF object classes which are discernible subject to the formal context. The dimension reduction
from |M∗| to 2nF can thus be relaised by mapping the |M∗| generalised attributes in V0M onto 2nF attribute classes in
VFM , as is illustrated in Table II. Notice that each of the 2nF classes is given with respect to a definite general extent
3X ∈ EF as [X]F = {µ ∈M∗ | µR = X} (Definition 2.11 in Ref. [1]), where EF includes all the possible unions of the
members in G/R (|G/R| = nF by Definition 2.4 of Ref. [1]). Adopting [X]F as the intent of general concept turns out
to be more intuitive than adopting the pair (ρ(X), η(X)) since [X]F is itself an equivalent class.
Proposition 2.1. Subject to the formal context F (G,M), the 2-tuple (X, [X]F ) with X ∈ EF is more appropriate
than (X, ρ(X), η(X)) (Proposition 3.4 in Ref. [1]) for the general concept framework, where [X]F is referred to as the
general intent. The following statements concerning the general concept framework are in order.
• [X]F can be deduced from ρ(X) and η(X) without any additional assumption.
[X]F = [η(X), ρ(X)], where [η(X), ρ(X)] = {µ ∈M∗ | η(X) ≤ µ ≤ ρ(X)}.
• The GCL exhausts whatever attributes from M∗, M∗ = ⋃X∈EF [X]F .
• Different general intents do not overlap: ∀Xi∀Xj ∈ EF [Xi]F ∩ [Xj ]F = ∅ iff Xi 6= Xj.
• The general concept (X, [X]F ) can be employed as the node on the lattice since the ordering can be unambiguously
defined. Denoting the nodes li and lj with
{
li=(Xi,[Xi]F ).
lj=(Xj ,[Xj ]F )
,
li 6= lj ⇐⇒
{
Xi 6=Xj
[Xi]F 6=[Xj ]F , li < lj ⇐⇒
{
Xi⊂Xj
[Xi]F<[Xj ]F
Proof. The closed interval [η(X), ρ(X)] is well-defined since ∀X ∈ EF η(X) =
∏
[X]F ≤
∑
[X]F = ρ(X). Here, the
general intent also includes all the attributes lying between η(X) and ρ(X).
• ∀µ ∈ [X]F = {µ ∈ M∗ | µR = X} ρ(X) ≥ µ ≥ η(X) ∴ µ ∈ [X]F =⇒ µ ∈ [η(X), ρ(X)]. On the other hand,
µ ∈ [η(X), ρ(X)] =⇒
{
µR⊇η(X)R=X
µR⊆ρ(X)R=X (Proposition 3.4 in Ref. [1]), which implies that µ
R = X, i.e., µ ∈ [X]F .
Therefore, µ ∈ [X]F ⇐⇒ η(X) ≤ µ ≤ ρ(X).
• Since ∀µ ∈ M∗ µR ⊆ G (Definition 2.7, Lemma 2.8 in Ref. [1]) and EF =
{
µR | µ ∈M∗}, ⋃X∈EF [X]F =⋃
µ∈M∗ [µ
R]F = M
∗.
• [Xi]F ∩ [Xj ]F = ∅ contradicts Xi = Xj , which implies that [Xi]F = [Xj ]F , ∴ [Xi]F ∩ [Xj ]F = ∅ =⇒ Xi 6= Xj .
On the other hand, if Xi 6= Xj then µRi 6= µRj and hence µi 6= µj (cf. Lemma 2.10 in Ref. [1]), ∀µi ∈ [Xi]F ∀µj ∈
[Xj ]F . Consequently, Xi 6= Xj =⇒ [Xi]F ∩ [Xj ]F = ∅. Therefore, [Xi]F ∩ [Xj ]F = ∅ ⇐⇒ Xi 6= Xj .
• (Xi, [Xi]F ) 6= (Xj , [Xj ]F ) ⇐⇒ Xi 6= Xj and [Xi]F 6= [Xj ]F since [Xi]F ∩ [Xj ]F = ∅ ⇐⇒ Xi 6= Xj . Consider
then [Xi]F < [Xj ]F as
{
ρ(Xi)<ρ(Xj)
η(Xi)<η(Xj)
since Xi ⊂ Xj ⇐⇒
{
ρ(Xi)<ρ(Xj)
η(Xi)<η(Xj)
(Proposition 3.14 in Ref. [1]). Therefore,
li < lj ⇐⇒
{
Xi⊂Xj
[Xi]F<[Xj ]F
.
While the general extents are all the object classes discernible from the perspective of the formal context, every
general intent [X]F collects the attributes all the members of the general extent X possess in common, where ρ(X)
and η(X) happen to be the upper and lower bound of [X]F , respectively. The general concept (X, ρ(X), η(X)) thus
far relates to the RSL-concept and FCL-concept as follows.
• If X appears to be an RSL extent, its corresponding intent X = {m ∈M | mR ⊆ X}, see Eq. (8) of Ref. [1],
collects all the unique attributes in M which are not observed on the members of Xc. Since carrying any part of
these attributes suffices to ensure that an object belongs to X, the rough-set property as the logical OR of the
members in X faithfully characterises the RSL intent. Subsequently, the general rough-set property (Grsp)
can be deduced via the extension from F (G,M) to F ∗(G,M∗) as
ρ(X) =
∑
X
∗
=
∑
{µ ∈M∗ | µR ⊆ X} =
∑
X0⊆X
(∑
[X0]F
)
≡
∑
[X]F . (2)
• If X is an FCL extent X, its intent collects all the attributes in M possessed in common by X, say XI = {m ∈
M | mR ⊇ X}. Since members in X essentially possess all these attributes, the formal-concept property as the
logical AND of the members in XI faithfully characterises the FCL intent. Likewise, the general formal-concept
property (Gfcp) is obtained via the extension from F (G,M) to F ∗(G∗,M) as
η(X) =
∏
XI
∗
=
∏
{µ ∈M∗ | µR ⊇ X} =
∏
X0⊇X
(∏
[X0]F
)
≡
∏
[X]F . (3)
4• Moreover, the conjugate relation η(Xc) = ¬ρ(X) (Proposition 3.7 in Ref. [1]) can have a natural interpretation
in terms of the conventional modal logics. With ρ(X), it is not possible that any object x in Xc possess the
property ρ since otherwise x ∈ X. Hence, by “not possible = definitely not” any object x ∈ Xc definitely has
the property NOT ρ(X), also, any object in Xc definitely possesses η(Xc). Therefore, η(Xc) = ¬ρ(X). Note
that in Eq. (2) and (3) the operators I∗ and ∗ are respectively obtained from I and  by means of extending
the attribute range to M∗, and the same relationship also holds between ♦∗ and ♦ (Definition 3.3 in Ref. [1]).
It should however be clear that the emergence of GCL need not be based on the RSL and FCL, although the GCL
can be acquired as a common generalisation from RSL and FCL, see Lemma 2.8 and 3.1 of Ref. [1]. Indeed, one can
use the content of GCL to construct several extensions of the RSL and FCL.
Proposition 2.2. Subject to F (G,M), a family of concept-lattice generalisations can be given as follows.
• The generalised FCL (gFCL) can be accomplished by the gFCL concept (X,Y )gFCL which satisfies XI∗ = Y and
Y I
∗
= X, where Y =
⋃
X0⊇X [X0]F ∀X ∈ EF .
• The generalised RSL (gRSL) can be accomplished by the gRSL concept (X,Y )gRSL which satisfies X∗ = Y and
Y ♦
∗
= X, where Y =
⋃
X0⊆X [X0]F ∀X ∈ EF .
• The complementary generalised RSL (cgRSL) can be furnished by the cgRSL concept (X,Y )cgRSL which satisfies
X♦
∗
= Y and Y 
∗
= X, where Y = M∗\⋃X0⊆G\X [X0]F ∀X ∈ EF .
Proof. Note that the relations among the derivation operators I, and ♦ (Eq. (4)-(7) in Ref. [1]) are preserved under
the substitutions
{
I→I∗
→∗
♦→♦∗
since F ∗(G,M∗) can be regarded as a new formal context.
• Upon employing Eq. (9) of Ref. [1] with the generalisation from M to M∗,
XI
∗
= {µ ∈M∗ | gRµ, g ∈ X} =
⋃
X0⊇X
{
µ ∈M∗ | µR = X0
}
=
⋃
X0⊇X
[X0]F .
Accordingly, consider Y = XI
∗
=
⋃
X0⊇X [X0]F , where
Y I
∗
= (
⋃
X0⊇X
[X0]F )
I∗ =
⋂
X0⊇X
([X0]F )
I∗ =
⋂
X0⊇X
{
µ ∈M∗ | µR = X0
}I∗
=
⋂
X0⊇X
X0 = X,
namely, Y I
∗
= X.
• Likewise, by Eq. (9) of Ref. [1],
X
∗
= {µ ∈M∗ | ∀g ∈ X, gRµ =⇒ g ∈ X} =
⋃
X0⊆X
{
µ ∈M∗ | µR = X0
}
=
⋃
X0⊆X
[X0]F = Y.
Moreover, Y ♦
∗
= (
⋃
X0⊇X [X0]F )
♦∗ =
⋃
X0⊆X([X0]F )
♦∗ =
⋃
X0⊆X X0 = X.
• As the generalisation of result in Ref. [8], if (X,Y ) satisfies
{
X
∗
=Y
Y ♦
∗
=X
then
{
(Xc)♦
∗
=Y c
(Y c)
∗
=Xc
, where apparently{
Xc=G\X
Y c=M∗\Y since X ⊆ G and Y ⊆ M∗. Then, the expression ∀X (Xc, (
⋃
X0⊆X [X0]F )
c)cgRSL can be used to
construct a concept lattice since expressions in this form are equipped with well-defined partial order. Subse-
quently, because both X and Xc belong to EF and one prefers using the expression with respect to X, the
cgRSL thus ranges over all the X ∈ EF with (X, (
⋃
X0⊆Xc [X0]F )
c)cgRSL ≡ (X,M∗\(
⋃
X0⊆G\X [X0]F ))cgRSL.
Certainly, on returning to the conventional scope based on F (G,M), the gFCL will be restricted to the FCL, the
gRSL will be restricted to the RSL, and the cgRSL will be restricted to the property-oriented RSL [8]. Nevertheless,
while both the gFCL and gRSL can be thought of as object-oriented, the cgRSL here cannot be regarded as a
property-oriented lattice that generalises the property-oriented RSL.
Notably, apart from Proposition 2.2, still more concept lattices could have been generated from the GCL by
means of the general intents. For instance, one could also consider (X,Y )new = (X,M
∗\(⋃X0⊇X [X0]F )) ∀X ∈ EF ,
where Y is the complementary set of the gFCL intent. However, for all those constructions it remains fundamental to
5F (G,M)
M
a b c d e
G
1 × × × ×
2 × ×
3 × ×
4 × ×
5 ×
6 × × ×
F ′(G,M)
M
1 2 3 4 5 6
G
a × × × ×
b × × ×
c × ×
d ×
e × × × ×
Table I: The formal context F (G,M) with (G,M) = ({1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, {a, b, c, d, e}) and the formal context F ′(G,M) with
(G,M) = ({a, b, c, d, e}, {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6})
Although transposing one of the contexts gives rise to the other one, there are two mathematically distinct concept lattices to
be constructed. One may assume U = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and V = {a, b, c, d, e} to be what are conventionally recognised as objects
and attributes, respectively. According to the setting of Ref. [8], the choice F (G,M) in which (U, V ) ≡ (G,M) is referred to
as an object-oriented scheme and F ′(G,M) ((V,U) ≡ (G,M)) a property-oriented scheme.
have the intelligibility about why to relate the object class and its associating property in particular ways. It is based
on such intelligibility that the analytics accompanied with lattice can be performed. In this regard, the gFCL deals
with the necessary feature an object in any given class should exhibit and the gRSL the sufficient feature by which
an object can be categorised into a definite class, while the artificial constructions like cgRSL or (X,Y )new could
become less significant. Another point is that the lattices introduced in Proposition 2.2 are nested in the sense that
the attributes in M∗ are used as intents in a repeated manner. Clearly, the fact that the intents overlap can render
the analysis difficult. Nevertheless, both the gFCL and the gRSL can be regarded as a half of the GCL, whose intents
are then disjoint (Proposition 2.1). For concreteness, if (X,Y1) is a gFCL concept and (X,Y2) is a gRSL concept
then (X,Y1 ∩Y2) is a general concept. The tractability problem for the GCL content will then be resolved as follows.
• For the lattice construction:
The general extents are known in advance subject to F (G,M), which are the 2nF members in EF = {µR |
µ ∈ M∗} = σ({mR | m ∈ M}). The generalised attribute-set M∗ is distributed to the 2nF nodes as gen-
eral intents, each of which is expressible in terms of a closed interval. Thus, one only needs the 2 × 2nF
bounds (Proposition 2.1) for fixing down the general intents, which further reduces to 2nF attributes since
∀X ∈ EF η(Xc) = ¬ρ(X) and X ∈ EF ⇐⇒ Xc ∈ EF (Proposition 3.7 in Ref. [1]). Basically, these 2nF
attributes can be determined using a fundamental nF attribute construction (Proposition 3.9, 3.11 and 3.12;
Corollary 3.13 in Ref. [1]). However, it will be further shown in the coming section that they can be directly
read out from the formal context; the practical construction for GCL is as tractable as listing out the formal
context.
• For the implication relations:
The GCL supports the logic deduction by characterising any object class of interest in terms of non-overlapping
general intent, whose upper and lower bounds corresponds to the sufficient and necessary properties of the given
object class, respectively. To be concrete, attributes grouped into the same general intent are logically equivalent
since they correspond to the property of the same object class. One will show in Sec. 4 that a unique formula
based on the contextual truth 1η or falsity 0ρ (Proposition 3.12 in Ref. [1]) suffices to generate all such logic
implications established between any attribute pairs in M∗.
3. LATTICE CONSTRUCTION PER READ OUT
To proceed with the construction of the general concept (Proposition 2.1)
(X, ρ(X), η(X)) ≡ (X, [X]F ) = (X, [η(X), ρ(X)]), (4)
let X =
⋃
Dk⊆X Dk and X =
⋂
G\Dk⊇X G\Dk for any general extent, where Dk’s are the smallest object sets
discernible by the formal context (Definition 2.4, Proposition 3.5 in Ref. [1]). After Proposition 3.7 and 3.9 of Ref. [1],
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Figure 1: Drawing the Contextual Venn diagram for the F (G,M) in Table I
The full objects of interest G are partitioned into nF = 5 classes, which are discernible by the formal context, say
{D1, D2, . . . D5}. Here, one determines the relations among all the attributes on VFM by means of {mR | m ∈ M} subject
to F (G,M). For example, “a” corresponds to the region covering aR = {1, 2, 5, 6} and so forth. Moreover, for each disjoint
region Dk one has η(Dk) =
∏
m∈M αm, where αm = m for m
R ⊇ Dk and αm = ¬m otherwise. For example, η({1}) = a¬bcde
and so forth, as is depicted on the rightmost diagram.
←− 4294967296 columns grouped into 32 equivalent classes −→
[X]F [{1, 2, 5, 6}]F [{3, 4, 6}]F [{1, 2}]F [{1}]F [{1, 3, 4, 6}]F [∅]F [G]F [{2}]F [{3, 4}]F etc.
M∗
a . . . b . . . c . . . d . . . e . . . 0 . . . 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
G/R
{1} × . . .× × . . .× × . . .× × . . .× × . . .× . . . . . . . . .
{2} × . . .× × . . .× × . . .× × . . .× . . . . . . . . .
{3, 4} × . . .× × . . .× × . . .× × . . .× . . . . . . . . .
{5} × . . .× × . . .× . . . . . . . . .
{6} × . . .× × . . .× × . . .× × . . .× . . . . . . . . .
Table II: The factorisation of |M∗| attributes into 2nF equivalent classes, exemplified with F (G,M) in Table I
For convenience, it is assumed that all the members in M are independent. Based on a given formal context it is possible, albeit
tedious, to determine the object correspondence to all the attributes that can be constructed out of M , i.e. M∗ because this is
nothing but the completion of a truth-value table. Accordingly, any µ in M∗ must end up with µR ∈ EF (µR ⊆ G). It turns
out that M∗ can be further categorised: since nF = 5 (|EF | = 2|nF |), the |M∗| = 225 = 4294967296 generalised attributes can
be grouped into 25 equivalent classes ([X]F s). Indeed, |[X]F | is even a constant over the GCL (Corollary 4.4).
one may end up with the relations
η(X) =
∏
{η(G\Dk) | G\Dk ⊇ X}, ρ(X) =
∑
{ρ(Dk) | Dk ⊆ X},
η(X) = η0(X) · 1η, ρ(X) = ρ0(X) + 0ρ,
η(G) ≡ 1η =
∏
[G+]F , ρ(∅) ≡ 0ρ =
∑
[∅×]F ,
η0(G\Dk) =
∏
[(G\Dk)+]F , ρ0(Dk) =
∑
[D×k ]F , (5)
where X+ (X×) is referred to as an X-irreducible disjunction (conjunction) (Definition 2.14, Corollary 3.13 in Ref. [1]).
In addition, ρ(∅) = 0ρ and η(G) = 1η since ρ(∅) plays the role of falsity for all the upper bounds and η(G) plays the
7role of truth for all the lower bounds (Proposition 3.12 in Ref. [1]). As an example, Fig. 2 illustrates how ρ0(Dk) and
η0(G\Dk) are determined from the irreducible expressions given in Eq. (5). Specifically, in the same manner,
η(G) ≡ 1η =
∏
[G+]F = (a+ b)(a+ e)(a+ ¬c)(a+ ¬d)(b+ c+ ¬d)(b+ c+ ¬e)(b+ d+ ¬e)
(b+ ¬d+ e)(¬b+ ¬c)(¬b+ ¬d)(¬b+ e)(c+ ¬d)(¬c+ d+ ¬e)(¬d+ e), (6)
which conjuncts all the irreducible disjunctions of the attributes in M˘ = M ∪ {¬m | m ∈M}. Notably,
(a+ b)R = . . . = (b+ d+ ¬e)R = (b+ ¬d+ e)R = . . . = (¬d+ e)R = G,
where, e.g., (b+c+¬d) ∈ [G+]F is irreducible because (b+c+¬d)R = G but none of
{
(b+ c)R, (c+ ¬d)R, (b+ ¬d)R}
can be identified with G.
Note that the approach based on Eq. (5) in general renders ρ(X) in DNF and η(X) in CNF, which is instructive
for the generality of GCL in relation to the other lattices since one has in effect obtained ρ(X) in the style of RSL
and η(X) in the style of FCL. However, such an approach is rather tedious thus should not be recommeded in actual
practice. Now one proceeds to show that adopting η(X) in DNF and ρ(X) in CNF will provide a simpler construction
which potentially leads to the full determination of general concepts per read out.
Proposition 3.1. Subject to a formal context F (G,M), η(G) ≡ 1η =
∑nF
k=1 η(Dk). In effect, 1η is obtained by
summing up all the lower bounds of intents corresponding to disjoint regions on the contextual Venn diagram, cf.
Fig. 1.
Proof. ∀k ∈ [1, nF ] η(G) > η(Dk) by Proposition 3.10, 3.14 in Ref. [1] ∴ η(G) ≥
∑nF
k=1 η(Dk). On the other hand,
(
∑nF
k=1 η(Dk))
R =
⋃nF
k=1 η(Dk)
R = G ∴
∑nF
k=1 η(Dk) ∈ [G]F . Hence, η(G) ≤
∑nF
k=1 η(Dk) since η(G) =
∏
[G]F is the
lower bound for [G]F (Proposition 2.1).
Since η(Dk) =
∏
Ψk, where Ψk = {m ∈ M | m ∈ DIk} ∪ {¬m | m 6∈ DIk,m ∈ M} by Proposition 3.10 in Ref. [1],
Eq. (6) can also be computed as
1η =
nF∑
k=1
Ψk = a¬bcde+ a¬bc¬d¬e+ ¬ab¬c¬de+ a¬b¬c¬d¬e+ ab¬c¬de. (7)
Lemma 3.2. Given a formal context F (G,M), it can be shown that
• η(G\Dk) ≡ η0(G\Dk) · 1η =
∑
j 6=k η(Dj),
• ρ(Dk) ≡ ρ0(Dk) + 0ρ =
∏
j 6=k ρ(G\Dj).
Proof. The fact that η(G\Dk) = η0(G\Dk) · 1η and ρ(Dk) = ρ0(Dk) + 0ρ is the direct consequence of Eq. (5).
• η(G\Dk) ≥
∑
j 6=k η(Dj) since η(G\Dk) ≥ η(Dj) by G\Dk ⊇ η(Dj) ∀j 6= k due to Proposition 3.14 in Ref. [1].
On the other hand, η(G\Dk) ≤ µ ∀µ ∈ [G\Dk]F , implying that η(G\Dk) ≤
∑
j 6=k η(Dj) by (
∑
j 6=k η(Dj))
R =
G\Dk. Therefore, η(G\Dk) =
∑
j 6=k η(Dj).
• By the conjugateness of Proposition 3.7 in Ref. [1], ρ(Dk) = ¬η(G\Dk) = ¬
∑
j 6=k η(Dj). It follows then
¬∑j 6=k η(Dj) = ∏j 6=k ¬η(Dj) = ∏j 6=k ρ(G\Dj).
Let D1 = {1}, D2 = {2}, D3 = {3, 4}, D4 = {5} and D5 = {6}. In Fig. 2, it can be checked that
η0(G\D1) · 1η = ¬d(b+ ¬e)(¬c+ ¬e) · 1η
= a¬bc¬d¬e+ ¬ab¬c¬de+ a¬b¬c¬d¬e+ ab¬c¬de = η(G\D1).
Proposition 3.3. Given a formal context F (G,M), one may express the general extent in terms of X =
⋃
k∈K Dk ≡⋂
k∈K0\K G\Dk for some K ⊆ K0, where the index set K0 := {1, · · · , nF }. The upper and lower bounds for the
corresponding general intents are as follows.
• η(X) = ∑k∈K η(Dk) and ρ(X) = ∏k∈K0\K ρ(Dck), which is in contrast to Proposition 3.9 of Ref. [1] that can
be restated as ρ(X) =
∑
k∈K ρ(Dk) and η(X) =
∏
k∈K0\K η(D
c
k).
8•
{
η(
⋃
iXi) =
∑
i η(Xi), ρ(
⋂
j Xj) =
∏
j ρ(Xj)
ρ(
⋃
iXi) =
∑
i ρ(Xi), η(
⋂
j Xj) =
∏
j η(Xj)
in which Xi, Xj ∈ EF .
Proof. • For X ∈ EF , X =
⋃
Dk⊆X Dk =
⋂
Dck⊇X G\Dk, as is given in Proposition 3.5 of Ref. [1], can be rewritten
as X =
⋃
k∈K Dk =
⋂
k∈K0\K G\Dk for some K ⊆ K0, where G =
⋃
k∈K0 Dk. Hence,
η(X) =
∏
k∈K0\K
η(Dck) =
∏
k∈K0\K
∑
k′ 6=k
η(Dk′) =
∑
k′∈⋂k∈K K0\{k}
η(Dk′) =
∑
k∈K
η(Dk),
where the first equality is based on Proposition 3.9 in Ref. [1], the second one makes use of Lemma 3.2 and
the third one is due to the fact that η(Dk) · η(Dk′) = 0 for k 6= k′. Moreover, since η(X) =
∑
k∈K η(Dk), one
has η(Xc) = η(
⋂
k∈K D
c
k) =
∑
j∈K0\K η(Dj). Therefore, by conjugateness (Proposition 3.7 in Ref. [1]),
ρ(X) = ¬η(Xc) = ¬
∑
j∈K0\K
η(Dj) =
∏
k∈K0\K
¬η(Dk),
where ¬η(Dk) = ρ(Dck).
• Let ∀Xl ∈ EF Xl =
⋃
k∈Kl Dk =
⋂
k∈K0\Kl G\Dk, where Kl ⊆ K0. Thus,
⋃
i
Xi =
⋃
i
⋃
k∈Ki
Dk ∴ η(
⋃
i
Xi) =
∑
i
(∑
k∈Ki
η(Dk)
)
=
∑
i
η(Xi), ρ(
⋃
i
Xi) =
∑
i
(∑
k∈Ki
ρ(Dk)
)
=
∑
i
ρ(Xi)
⋂
j
Xj =
⋂
j
⋂
k∈Kj
Dck ∴ ρ(
⋂
j
Xj) =
∏
j
( ∏
k∈Kj
ρ(Dck)
)
=
∏
j
ρ(Xj), η(
⋂
j
Xj) =
∏
j
( ∏
k∈Kj
η(Dck)
)
=
∏
j
η(Xj),
where the above results as well as Proposition 3.9 of Ref. [1] are recursively utilised.
Another significant point is about the decompositon of freedom incorporated in M∗. If the attributes in M are
independent (not exclusive) then any attribute pairs in M intersect non-trivially, giving rise to 2|M | disjoint regions on
the Venn diagram V0M . |M∗| reaches the maximum value 22
|M|
because any of the generalised attributes corresponds
to a disjunction of some of the 2|M | disjoint regions on V0M . In general, the members in M may be intrinsically related
such that r(≥ 0) of the disjoint regions vanish on the Venn diagram VM , thus, |M∗| = 22|M|/2r ≤ 22|M| . Notably,
disjoint regions on the Venn diagram correspond to the M∗-atoms collected in binf (M∗) = {µ ∈ M∗ | µ M 0}
(Lemma 2.12, Corollary 2.13 in Ref. [1]). One may henceforth adopt ek ∈ binf (M∗), where ek · ek′ k 6=k
′
= 0, as a
convention for basis:
ek ≡ ek(M), k ∈ K∗ := {1, 2, . . . , rank(M)}, (8)
rank(M) = |binf (M∗)| = log|M
∗|
2 = 2
|M | − r.
Note that rank(M) is a particular integer describing the freedom in M∗ subject to the intrinsic constraint held among
members in M and ek ≡ ek(M) is to mark that ek is also constructed out of M . However, it turns out formally
M∗ = (binf (M∗))∗ = (M∗)∗, rank(M) = rank (binf (M∗)) = rank(M∗),
highlighting that the set M which gives rise to the generalised attribute set M∗ with rank(M∗) = 2|M | − r need not
be unique. Indeed, there are abundant choices of M∗ fulfilling such a requirement, which will furnish the framework
for analysing the reparametisation of the formal context in the next paper. Here, an immediate example appears to
be the choice M0 ≡ binf (M∗) such that M∗0 = M∗ whenever M 6= binf (M∗). Certainly, M0 then manifests a intrinsic
constraint in the sense that it only consists mutually exclusive members.
Turning back to the lattice construction, a primary concern is about how the GCL presents itself.
Definition 3.4. The GCL subject to a formal context will be henceforth referred to as ΓF (G,M), cf. Poposi-
tion 3.16 in Ref. [1], which is uniquely prescribed by either of
• the η-representation ΥFη (G,M) := [η(D1), . . . , η(DnF )] ≡ [η1, . . . , ηnF ],
9• the ρ-representation ΥFρ (G,M) := [ρ(G\D1), . . . , ρ(G\DnF )] ≡ [¬η1, . . . ,¬ηnF ],
where nF denotes the number of subclasses discernible from the point of view of F (G,M).
According to Proposition 3.1, obtaining the η-representation or the ρ-representation is a simple one-scan task,
on the formal context. For the F (G,M) in Table I, it is straightforward to write down
ΥFη = [a¬bcde︸ ︷︷ ︸
η(D1)
, a¬bc¬d¬e︸ ︷︷ ︸
η(D2)
,¬ab¬c¬de︸ ︷︷ ︸
η(D3)
D3={3,4}
, a¬b¬c¬d¬e︸ ︷︷ ︸
η(D4)
, ab¬c¬de︸ ︷︷ ︸
η(D5)
].
Note that Proposition 3.3 in fact provides simple identifications for the whole GCL structure. For convenience,
assume that it is the first nF M
∗-atoms in the convention of Eq. (8) which enter η(X) as constituents:
η(Dk) ≡ ηk =
∏
Ψk := ek, k ∈ K0 = {1, 2, . . . , nF } ⊆ K∗, (9)
where Ψk = {m ∈ M | m ∈ DIk} ∪ {¬m | m 6∈ DIk,m ∈ M} (cf. Eq. (7)). Then, η(X) = η(
⋃
k∈K Dk) =∑
k∈K ηk, which picks up a subset K ⊆ K0 from the expression 1η =
∑
k∈K0 ηk (Proposition 3.1). Likewise,
ρ(
⋂
k∈K0\K G\Dk) =
∏
k∈K0\K ¬ηk picks up all the components which are not in K from the expression 0ρ =∏
k∈K0 ¬ηk since ρ(G\Dk) = ¬ηk ∀k ∈ K. It is then straightforward to extract the general extents and intents via
nF -bit binary masks from a known GCL structure as follows. Let BX be the binary string whose kth bit B
k
X is given
as
{
BkX=1 if Dk⊆X
BkX=0 if Dk 6⊆X
. Then, for any X ∈ EF there is a binary string BX marking the Dk’s that X contains; any of
nF -bit binary strings corresponds to a definite general extent. One may thus write down that
X =
⋃
{Dk | BkX = 1, k ∈ K0},
η(X) = [BX ]η =
∑
{ηk | BkX = 1, k ∈ K0},
ρ(X) = [BX ]ρ =
∏
{¬ηk | BkX = 0. k ∈ K0}. (10)
Thus, one has BG =“11111” which implies that η(G) = [11111]η = 1η in the above example, where 1η =
∑
ΥFη
sums up all the components of the η-representation of GCL (Definition 3.4). Likewise, B∅=“00000” tells that
ρ(∅) = [00000]ρ = 0ρ where 0ρ = ¬1η =
∏
ΥFρ is the product of all the components of the ρ-representation. Let one
also consider that ρ(X) =
∏
k ¬ek ≡
∏
k ¬ek·1 and η(X) =
∑
k ek ≡
∑
k ek+0. In such a manner, ρ(G) = [11111]ρ = 1
because one picks up no term in {¬e1, . . . ,¬e5} due to the absence of 0 in BG. Similarly, η(∅) = [00000]η = 0 due to
the absence of 1 in B∅.
It is also particularly interesting to rediscover the FCL and RSL within a known GCL structure (Fig. 3). After
Proposition 3.15 in Ref. [1], two steps are in order. Firstly, re-express the given η(X) in CNF and ρ(X) in DNF.
Then, one may collect from these expressions those attributes belonging to M to form a candidate FCL intent
Yc−fcl(X) and a candidate RSL intent Yc−rsl(X), respectively. Secondly, if (Yc−fcl(X))I = X then (X,Yc−fcl(X)) is
accepted as an FCL concept, whereas if (Yc−rsl(X))♦ = X then (X,Yc−rsl(X)) is accepted as an RSL concept. Note
that such constructions could be less intuitive for particular nodes. For instance, at X = ∅, one should imagine η(∅) =
0 = a ·b ·c ·d ·e · . . . (Step 1) so one ends up with the FCL concept (∅, {a, b, c, d, e}), based on aR∩bR∩cR∩dR∩eR = ∅
(Step 2). Similarly, ρ(G) = 1 = a+ b+ c+ d+ e+ . . . and aR ∪ bR ∪ cR ∪ dR ∪ eR = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} = G imply that
({1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, {a, b, c, d, e}) is a RSL concept. It seems by Proposition 3.15 of Ref. [1] that
EfclF =
{ ⋂
m∈M0
mR |M0 ⊆M
}
, ErslF =
{ ⋃
m∈M0
mR |M0 ⊆M
}
provide all the FCL and RSL extents. However, conventionally, one also regards the object class G as an FCL extent
and ∅ as an RSL extent, while, as object classes, G 6∈ EfclF and ∅ 6∈ ErslF . The point is that the FCL concept
corresponding to G do not always satisfy the condition
{
XI=Y
Y I=X
and the RSL concept corresponding to ∅ do not
always satisfy
{
X=Y
Y ♦=X
. In effect, e.g. in Fig. 3, (G, ∅) is determined via (⋃X∈EfclF X,⋂X∈EfclF Y (X)) and (∅, ∅) is
via (
⋂
X∈ErslF X,
⋂
X∈ErslF Y (X)), which are artificially appended as the lattice supremum and infimum respectively,
for the sake of the completeness of lattices [2, 8]. It should however be clear that there is no need of such artificial
completions for the gFCL and gRSL (Proposition 2.2). The conditions
{
XI
∗
=Y
Y I
∗
=X
and
{
X
∗
=Y
Y ♦
∗
=X
are well defined
because these conditions are all based on the general intents which are never empty sets. Indeed, the cardinality of
general intent even remains constant over EF , as will be demonstrated in Corollary 4.4.
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ρ0({2}) = c¬d + c¬e
η0(G\{1}) = η0({2,3,4,5,6}) = ¬d(b + ¬e)(¬c + ¬e)
c
¬d
c ¬e
¬e ¬e
¬d
b ¬c
Figure 2: Obtaining ρ0(Dk) and η0(G\Dk), via the irreducibility requirements from Eq. (5), for the case of Fig. 1
Resolving in this manner needs not be the most practical way to construct GCL, but it provides an intuitive understanding
for the irreducibility. ρ0({2}) = ∑[{2}×]F = c¬d+ c¬e in the sense that c¬d and c¬e are irreducible conjunctions which render
cR ∩ (¬d)R = cR ∩ (¬e)R = {2}. Similarly, η0(G\{1}) = ∏[{2, 3, 4, 5, 6}+]F = ¬d(b + ¬e)(¬c + ¬e) since ¬d, (b + ¬e) and
(¬c+ ¬e) are irreducible disjunctions for which ¬dR = (b+ ¬e)R = (¬c+ ¬e)R = {2, 3, 4, 5, 6}.
4. IMPLICATION RELATIONS
It is the object-attribute relationship resulted from the categorisation that leads to the logic significance implemented
by the GCL structure. Roughly speaking, one’s inspections of attributes are essentially restricted in a definite object
domain thus the attributes receive additional ordering prescriptions, which are the origins of the logic implication in
GCL. Here, as a primary observation, the attributes that play the roles of the bounds of general intents are equipped
with particular features:
∀µ ∈M∗ µ ≤ 1η ⇐⇒ µ = η(X) for some X ∈ EF
µ ≥ 0ρ ⇐⇒ µ = ρ(X) for some X ∈ EF
, (11)
which is a direct consequence of Proposition 3.3. In what follows, by matching any property of a given object with
a GCL one can determine its class belongingness in the GCL structure.
Proposition 4.1. Given a GCL subject to the formal context F (G,M), ∀µ ∈ M∗ (µR, [µ · 1η, µ + 0ρ]) is a general
concept, cf. Proposition 2.1 and Eq. (4), every general concept of the GCL can be unambiguously represented by
(µR, [µR]F ) with some µ ∈M∗.
Proof. Equation (11) implies that ∀µ, µ · 1η is a lower bound of some general intent, i.e. η(X) with some X ∈ EF ,
because µ · 1η ≤ 1η. Likewise, µ + 0ρ can be identified as the upper bound ρ(X ′) with some X ′ ∈ EF . Moreover,
X ′ = (µ+0ρ)R = µR = (µ·1η)R = X. Therefore, (µ·1η) = η(µR) and (µ+0ρ) = ρ(µR) implies that (µR, [µ·1η, µ+0ρ])
is always a general concept. On the other hand, for any given X ∈ EF , any µ ∈ [X]F will render (µR, [µR]F )
a general concept, as is demonstrated above. This is not ambiguous since general intents are disjoint, namely,
∀Xi∀Xj ∈ EF [Xi]F ∩ [Xj ]F = ∅ ⇐⇒ Xi 6= Xj (Proposition 2.1).
Corollary 4.2. Given a formal context F (G,M), ∀X ∈ EF ,
• ρ(X) = η(X) + 0ρ and η(X) = ρ(X) · 1η,
• ρ(X) · ¬η(X) = 0ρ and ¬ρ(X) + η(X) = 1η.
Proof. • According to Proposition 4.1, substituting µ = η(X) and µ = ρ(X) into the expression (µR, [µ · 1η, µ+
0ρ]) must lead to the same general concept since ρ(X)
R = η(X)R = X. Consequently, (X, [η(X), η(X) + 0ρ]) =
(X, [ρ(X) · 1η, ρ(X)]) implies that η(X) + 0ρ = ρ(X) and η(X) = ρ(X) · 1η.
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Figure 3: Rediscovering the traditional concept lattices on the GCL
The circled points are nodes existing on the FCL, whereas the bold ones belong to the RSL. To determine their intents, note that
the FCL-intent can always be found from the lower bound in CNF of the corrsponding general intent and RSL-intent the upper
bound the DNF, see Proposition 3.15 in Ref.[1]. Consider, e.g., [11011]η = a¬bcde + a¬bc¬d¬e + a¬b¬c¬d¬e + ab¬c¬de ≡
a(¬b + e)(¬d + e)(¬b + ¬c)(¬b + ¬d)(c + ¬d)(b + c + ¬e)(b + d + ¬e)(¬c + d + ¬e) and [11011]ρ = a + ¬b + c + d + ¬e, as
can be determined in the manner of Fig ??. Now that aR = {a}I = (a+ c+ d)R = {a, c, d}♦ = {1, 2, 5, 6}, one rediscovers
the formal concepts ({1, 2, 5, 6}, {a}) for FCL and ({1, 2, 5, 6}, {a, c, d}) for RSL. Clearly, it is unwarranted that both the FCL
and RSL possess common extents, the collection of common extents for RSL and FCL essentially includes
{
aR, bR, cR, dR, eR
}
(see Proposition 3.2 in Ref. [1]). Take for instance the object set {1, 6}, which is an FCL-extent but not an RSL-extent. Here,
η({1, 6}) = a¬bcde+ ab¬c¬de = ae(¬bcd+ b¬c¬d) leads to {1, 6}I = {a, e} since (ae)R = {a, e}I = {1, 6}. On the other hand,
ρ({1, 6}) = (¬a + b + ¬c + d + e)(a + ¬b + c + d + ¬e)(¬a + b + c + d + e) ≡ d + ab + ce + ¬be + ¬a¬e seems to suggest the
concept ({1, 6}, {d}) for RSL. However, it fails, as dR ≡ {d}♦ = {1} 6= {1, 6}.
• η(X) and ρ(X) can be respectively identified as µ · 1η and µ+ 0ρ for some µ ∈M∗. Therefore, ρ(X) · ¬η(X) =
(µ+ 0ρ) · ¬(µ · 1η) = (µ+ 0ρ) · (¬µ+ 0ρ) = 0ρ. On the other hand, ¬ρ(X) + η(X) = ¬(ρ(X) · ¬η(X)) = 1η.
Thus, 0ρ and 1η can furnish the connection between the upper and lower bounds for any [X]F . In addition,
ρ(X) · ¬η(X) and ¬ρ(X) + η(X) are in fact constants over the full GCL.
Corollary 4.3. The general intent [X]F is the equivalent class of attributes generated from the pair (ρ(X), η(X)):
∀X ∈ EF [X]F = {µ ∈M∗ | µ+ 0ρ = ρ(X), µ · 1η = η(X)}.
Proof. For all µ1 ∈ {µ ∈M∗ | µ+ 0ρ = ρ(X), µ · 1η = η(X)} one has the general concept (µR1 , ρ(µR1 ), η(µR1 )) in which
µR1 = X, i.e. µ1 ∈ [X]F (Proposition 4.1). Thus, µ1 ∈ {µ ∈ M∗ | µ+ 0ρ = ρ(X), µ · 1η = η(X)} =⇒ µ1 ∈ [X]F .
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On the other hand, if µ1 ∈ {µ ∈M∗ | µ+ 0ρ = ρ(X), µ · 1η = η(X)} then µR1 = X.
µ1 6∈ [X]F =⇒ µR1 6= X
(
∵
{
(µ1·1η)R=µR1 ∩G=µR1 6=X
(µ1+0ρ)
R=µR1 ∪∅6=X
)
which implies µ1 6∈ {µ ∈M∗ | µ+ 0ρ = ρ(X), µ · 1η = η(X)}.
Therefore, ∀µ1 ∈M∗, µ1 ∈ [X]F ⇐⇒ µ1 ∈ {µ ∈M∗ | µ+ 0ρ = ρ(X), µ · 1η = η(X)}.
It is also notworthy that by the nF general intents one in fact exhausts the whole generalised attribute set M
∗ in
view of 2(log
|M∗|
2 −nF ) × 2nF = |M∗|.
Corollary 4.4. Given a collection of general intents, say {[X1]F , [X2]F , . . . [Xn]F },
• if µi ∈ [Xi]F for 1 ≤ i ≤ n then
∑n
i=1 µi ∈ [
⋃n
i=1Xi]F as well as
∏n
i=1 µi ∈ [
⋂n
i=1Xi]F ,
• all the general intents for the general concept lattice are of the same cardinality: |[X]F | = 2(log
|M∗|
2 −nF ) ∀X ∈ EF
subject to the formal context F (G,M).
Proof. • Since µi ∈ [Xi]F , one has µi = η(Xi) + τi with some τi ∈ [0, 0ρ] by Proposition 2.1. Therefore,∑n
i=1 µi =
∑n
i=1 η(Xi) +
∑n
i=1 τi = η (
⋃n
i=1Xi) + τ ∈ [
⋃n
i=1Xi]F ,∏n
i=1 µi =
∏n
i=1 η(Xi) +
∏n
i=1 τi = η (
⋂n
i=1Xi) + τ
′ ∈ [⋂ni=1Xi]F
by Proposition 3.3 since τ =
∑n
i=1 τi ∈ [0, 0ρ] and τ ′ =
∏n
i=1 τi ∈ [0, 0ρ].
• ρ(X) = η(X) + 0ρ ∀X ∈ EF (Corollary 4.2). Hence, any µ ∈ [X]F ≡ [η(X), η(X) + 0ρ] can be written
as µ = η(X) + τ with 0 ≤ τ ≤ 0ρ. Upon employing the convention of Eq. (8) and (9), one may identify
0ρ =
∑log|M∗|2
k=nF+1
ek since 0ρ ·1η = 0 and 0ρ+1η = 1. Subsequently, any τ ∈ [0, 0ρ] can be written as τ =
∑
k∈Q ek
for some Q ⊆ K∗\K0 = {nF + 1, . . . , log|M
∗|
2 }. Therefore, |[X]F | = |[0, 0ρ]| = |2K
∗\K0 | = 2(log|M
∗|
2 −nF ).
According to Proposition 4.1, an object set X = µR for which µ ∈ [X]F can be acquired by µ + 0ρ = [BX ]ρ or
µ · 1η = [BX ]η, see Eq. (10). For instance, consider µ = a · ¬e+ c in Fig. 3. Then,
(a · ¬e+ c) · 1η = a¬bcde+ a¬bc¬d¬e+ a¬b¬c¬d¬e = [11010]η,
(a · ¬e+ c) + 0ρ = (a+ ¬b+ c+ d+ ¬e)(¬a+ ¬b+ c+ d+ ¬e) = [11010]ρ
both imply BX =“11010”, hence X = {1, 2, 5}, which could also be deduced from µR = aR∩eRc∪cR = {1, 2, 5}. This
is the logic foundation provided by inspecting µ for its object partial ordering from the object-attribute relationship
embedded in the GCL structure. However, the conventional interest of rules of implication are attribute based, where
the object reference is implicit. Thus, one’s primary concern here is the so-called implication informative above the
GCL framework, which was discussed originally in the traditional FCL framework [11].
Note that for FCL an implication relation A → B is considered between the attribute sets A ⊆ M and B ⊆ M .
Since the FCL in effect deals with the conjunctions of simple attributes in M , see Lemma 3.1 in Ref. [1], every FCL
rule receives a corresponding rule in the GCL:
A
fcl→ B with
{
A∈2M
B∈2M corresponds to µ1 → µ2 with
{
µ1:=
∏
A ∈M∗
µ2:=
∏
B ∈M∗ .
Therefore, one is interested in the implication µ1 → µ2 which relates between the generalised attributes µ1 ∈M∗ and
µ2 ∈ M∗ in the GCL theory. In particular, according to Ref. [11], A fcl→ B is a tautology (i.e. not informative) if
A ⊇ B, which means µ1 =
∏
A ≤∏B = µ2. Hence, if µ1 6≤ µ2 then the GCL rule µ1 → µ2 is informative.
Definition 4.5. Consider the implication statement µ1 → µ2 (µ1 implies µ2), where µ1 ∈M∗ and µ2 ∈M∗.
• If µ1 > µ2, µ1 → µ2 is referred to as a rule of purely informative implication (RPII).
• If µ1 6≤ µ2, µ1 → µ2 is referred to as a rule of informative implication (RII).
• If µ1 → µ2 is manifestly true (µ1 ≤ µ2) then it is referred to as a tautology (TT), in the sense that the
implication tells nothing new, and is re-denoted as µ1 =⇒ µ2.
Note that RPII is a particular class of RII’s in which no TT is involved.
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Lemma 4.6. For the GCL subject to the formal context F (G,M), the rules of implication between two attributes in
M∗ are well defined. Explicitly, ∀µ1∀µ2 ∈M∗, µ1 → µ2 can be identified as µR1 ⊆ µR2 : µ1 ↔ µ2 (µR1 = µR2 ) is referred
to as the T1 rule; µ1 → µ2 (µR1 ⊂ µR2 ) is referred to as the T2 rule.
• One may deduce T2 from T1 by TT.
• Knowing all the RPII’s suffices the full characterisation of RII’s (Definition 4.5).
Proof. Similar to the idea of A → AII in Ref. [11], the rule of implication µ1 → µ2 means that the object class
possessing µ1 must also be equipped with µ2. In other words, the object class possessing µ1 is included in the object
class possessing µ2, hence, µ
R
1 ⊆ µR2 . Note that the T1 rule is a bi-implication. With µR1 = µR2 := X, both µ1 and µ2
are in [X]F , they belong to the common property of the same object class and are thus regarded as equivalent. For
T2, let X1 = µ
R
1 and X2 = µ
R
2 , where X1 ⊂ X2. Thus, (µ1 ·µ2)R = X1 ∩X2 = X1, and µ1 ·µ2 ∈ [X1]F . Accordingly,
gRµ1 =⇒ gR(µ1 · µ2) entails that the object possessing µ1 must also possess µ2.
• This is to show that µR1 ⊂ µR2 implies µ1 → µ2 based on T1.
Since µR ∈ EF ∀µ ∈M∗, if µR1 ⊂ µR2 then η(µR1 ) < η(µR2 ) by Proposition 2.1 (also cf. Lemma 3.14 of Ref. [1]),
thus, η(µR1 ) =⇒ η(µR2 ). In addition, with µR1 ⊂ µR2 two T1 rules state that
{
µ1↔η(µR1 )
µ2↔η(µR2 )
. Therefore, based on
T1, µR1 ⊂ µR2 implies µ1 → µ2 (T2).
• Any rule µ1 → µ2 where µ2 and µ1 are not ordered is a RII. However, µ1 → µ2 is logically equivalent to
µ1 → µ1 · µ2 because one may invoke the tautology µ1 · µ2 =⇒ µ2 so as to recover µ1 → µ2. Apparently,
µ1 → µ1 · µ2 is an RPII since µ1 · µ2 < µ1. Therefore, knowing all the RPII’s suffices the full characterisation
of RII’s.
While T1 works in two directions, it is not always the case that both implications are informative. For instance,
if µ1 → µ2 is an RPII then µ1 ← µ2 is a TT since µ1 > µ2. Likewise, µ1 → µ2 of the type T2 needs not be a TT
because it is not necessarily µ1 < µ2 although µ
R
1 ⊂ µR2 . Moreover, none of T2 rules can be RPII since tautology has
been involved in deducing them from the T1 rules.
Proposition 4.7. All the rules of implication can be determined in the following sense.
• ∀µ ∈M∗, any RII with respect to µ can be deduced from µ→ µ · 1η by TT.
• ∀µ ∈M∗ µ→ µ · 1η is equivalent to ∀µ ∈M∗ µ+ 0ρ → µ when implementing the rules of implication.
Proof. Since knowing RPII suffices the full characterization of RII and all the rules of implication can be deduced
from the type T1 (Lemma 4.6), one is only interested in the T1/RPII ∀µ ∈M∗ written as
µ→ ν1 for ν1 ∈ [η(µR), µ) and ν2 → µ for ν2 ∈ (µ, ρ(µR)].
• By Proposition 4.1, µ → µ · 1η is equivalently to µ → η(µR). Since η(µR) is the lower bound of the interval
[η(µR), µ), the consequence of the disjunction-introduction
(
µ→ η(µR)) =⇒ (∀τ ∈M∗ (µ→ η(µR) + τ))
can exhaust all the possibilities of µ → ν1 for ν1 ∈ [η(µR), µ). On the other hand, ν2 · 1η = η(µR) for
ν2 ∈ (µ, ρ(µR)] ⊆ [µR]F , rendering ν2 → η(µR). Therefore, ν2 → µ for ν2 ∈ (µ, ρ(µR)] since η(µR) =⇒ µ.
• (∀µ ∈M∗ µ+ 0ρ → µ) ⇐⇒ (∀¬µ ∈M∗ ¬µ→ ¬(µ+ 0ρ)) ⇐⇒ (∀¬µ ∈M∗ ¬µ→ ¬µ · 1η)
⇐⇒ (∀µ ∈M∗ µ→ µ · 1η).
Therefore, by applying the formula µ → µ · 1η one is able to deduce all the logic implications implemented by
the GCL. Moreover, two additional points remain crucial in concluding that the result at hand in fact avoids the
tractability problem for implementing the logic content [3, 11–17] in FCL. Firstly, the GCL-based deduction is
sufficiently general to include implication rules deduced from FCL and RSL. Secondly, the unique formula µ→ µ · 1η
can furnish a systematic decision about whether any given rule is supported by the formal context.
• From the perspective of Ref. [11] A fcl→ B is furnished by AI ⊆ BI , while one may have its analogue in
RSL by identifying A
rsl→ B with A♦ ⊆ B♦. Moreover, there are two equivalence relations inspired by
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Lemma 3.1 of Ref. [1]: A
fcl→ B is equivalent to ∏A→∏B; A rsl→ B is equivalent to ∑A→∑B. Both
are particular cases of (µ1 → µ2) ⇐⇒ (µR1 ⊆ µR2 ) (Lemma 4.6) since
AI ⊆ BI ⇐⇒ µR1 ⊆ µR2 with
{
µ1=
∏
A
µ2=
∏
B
∵
{
AI=
⋂
m∈Am
R=(
∏
A)R=µR1
BI=
⋂
m∈Bm
R=(
∏
B)R=µR2
,
A♦ ⊆ B♦ ⇐⇒ µR1 ⊆ µR2 with
{
µ1=
∑
A
µ2=
∑
B
∵
{
A♦=
⋃
m∈Am
R=(
∑
A)R=µR1
B♦=
⋃
m∈Bm
R=(
∑
B)R=µR2
, (12)
where (A♦, B♦) and (AI , BI) are referred to the variant forms given in Eq. (9) of Ref. [1]. For instance, let one
inspect the content of ρ({1, 2}) > c > η({1, 2}) in Fig. 3 by employing the fact cR = {1, 2} is a common extent
of FCL and RSL, where implications of both types can be easily exhibited.
For c → η({1, 2}), the rule c → a¬bc(de + ¬d¬e) is of the type T1/RPII but its equivalent statement c →
a¬b(de + ¬d¬e) is simply a T2-rule, which is due to cR = {1, 2} ⊂ {1, 2, 5} = (a¬b(de + ¬d¬e))R. On the
other hand, {c} fcl→ {a} is due to {c}I = {1, 2} ⊂ {1, 2, 5, 6} = {a}I [11], in addition, {c} fcl→ {a, c}. Based on
Eq. (12), {c} fcl→ {a} becomes the T2-rule c → a and {c} fcl→ {a, c} becomes the T1-rule c → ac, both are the
consequences of (c→ a¬bc(de+ ¬d¬e)) =⇒ (c→ ac).
For ρ({1, 2})→ c, the rule c+d+(a+¬b+¬e)(¬a+b+e)(¬a+¬b+¬e)→ c can imply (d→ c) and (c+d→ c).
Discarding the disjunction symbol, it turns out that {d} rsl→ {c} and {c, d} rsl→ {c}, which are what one could
have achieved in RSL [22]: {d} rsl→ {c} is based on {d}♦ ⊆ {c}♦; {c, d} rsl→ {c} is based on {c, d}♦ ⊆ {c}♦. In
principle, identifying A
rsl→ B with A♦ ⊆ B♦ is the reasonable analogue of A fcl→ B with AI ⊆ BI .
• Note that it is not practical to list out all the possible RII’s. Instead, the GCL provides criteria to determine
whether a logic implication is allowable by the formal context. Since µ1 → µ2 is defined by µR1 ⊆ µR2 , which
entails η(µR1 ) ≤ η(µR2 ) (Proposition 3.14 in Ref. [1]), the µ1 → µ2 is an implication allowable by the formal
context iff µ1 · 1η =⇒ µ2 · 1η. Since 1η is logically true subject to the formal context, it always coexists with
any other attribute. In other words, one requires µ1 → µ2 to be true under the condition 1η:
(1η → (µ1 → µ2)) ⇐⇒ (µ1 · 1η → µ2 · 1η) . (13)
Moreover, if µ1 → µ2 is allowable by 1η then one has µ1 · 1η =⇒ µ2 · 1η, i.e., µ1 · 1η ≤ µ2 · 1η. For example, by
employing Eq. (7) for the 1η obtained in Fig. 3, one has
c→ a ∵ a¬bc(de+ ¬d¬e)︸ ︷︷ ︸
c·1η
< a¬bc(de+ ¬d¬e) + a¬c¬d(be+ ¬b¬e)︸ ︷︷ ︸
a·1η
¬e→ a+ ¬b¬d ∵ ¬e · 1η = a¬bc¬d¬e+ a¬b¬c¬d¬e < (a+ ¬b¬d) · 1η
d↔ ace ∵ d · 1η = a¬bcde = ace · 1η
b+ cd↔ e ∵ (b+ cd) · 1η = a¬bcde+ ¬ab¬c¬de+ ab¬c¬de = e · 1η
c
{
6→
6← e ∵ c · 1η = a¬bc(de+ ¬d¬e)
{ 6>
6=
6<
a¬bcde+ ¬ab¬c¬de+ ab¬c¬de = e · 1η (14)
Another interesting point is about the limit at which the contextual truth 1η becomes the real logical truth 1.
Under consideration is thus the degenerate GCL which emerges from a degenerate formal context as follows.
Proposition 4.8. Subject to F (G,M), the following statements are all equivalent, which defines the degenerate formal
context: S1. nF = log
|M∗|
2 . S2. ∀X ∈ EF ρ(X) = η(X). S3. 1η = 1 and 0ρ = 0. S4. ∀µ ∈M∗ [µR]F = {µ}.
Proof. Consider S1 =⇒ S2 =⇒ S3 =⇒ S4 =⇒ S1, which entails S1 ⇐⇒ S2 ⇐⇒ S3 ⇐⇒ S4, as follows.
S1 =⇒ S2: If nF = log|M
∗|
2 then |[X]F | = 1 (Corollary 4.4). Moreover, ρ(X) ≥ η(X) and
{
η(X)∈[X]F
ρ(X)∈[X]F , therefore,
ρ(X) = η(X).
S2 =⇒ S3: ρ(X) = η(X), thus, ∀µ ∈M∗ µ · 1η = µ+ 0ρ (Proposition 4.1), which renders µ ≥ µ · 1η = µ+ 0ρ ≥ µ
by Eq. (11). Therefore, ∀µ µ · 1η = µ = µ+ 0ρ which implies 1η = 1 and 0ρ = 0.
S3 =⇒ S4: µ+ 0ρ = µ+ 0 = µ · 1 = µ · 1η = µ ∴ [µR]F = [µ+ 0ρ, µ · 1η] = [µ, µ] = {µ}.
S4 =⇒ S1: ∀Xi∀Xj ∈ EF [Xi]F ∩ [Xj ]F = ∅ iff Xi 6= Xj (Proposition 2.1). Moreover, with S4, ∀µ ∈ M∗, µR
can be identified as some X ∈ EF , which is given by
{
µR | µ ∈M∗}. Therefore, ∀X ∈ EF |[X]F | = 1 = 2log|M∗|2 −nF ,
which implies log
|M∗|
2 = nF .
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Figure 4: A GCL obtained after removing {a, b, d} from M = {a, b, c, d, e} in the formal context F (G,M) of Table I, say
Fres({1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, {c, e})
Various object classes collapse into one, because the remaining attributes are insufficient to preserve the categorizations offered
by Fig. 1. The 16 boxed general extents mark the residual classification on the original GCL to form a degenerate one.
Notably, ρ(X) = η(X) ∀X ∈ EFres , e.g., η({2, 5}) = [0101]η = c¬e+ ¬c¬e = ¬e = (¬c+ ¬e)(c+ ¬e) = [0101]ρ = ρ({2, 5}).
Corollary 4.9. Subject to a degenerate formal context, say FD(G,M), ∀µ∀µ′ ∈M∗ µ ≤ µ′ iff µR⊆(µ′)R.
Proof. One now proceeds the proof in two parts.
Firstly, µ = µ′ FD⇐⇒ µR = (µ′)R: It is clear that µ = µ′ =⇒ µR = (µ′)R. Reversely, if µR = (µ′)R then
{µ} = [µR]FD = [(µ′)R]FD = {µ′}, i.e. µ = µ′. Therefore, µ = µ′ ⇐⇒ µR=(µ′)R.
Secondly, µ < µ′ FD⇐⇒ µR ⊂ (µ′)R: With µ = µ′ ⇐⇒ µR=(µ′)R, the formula µ < µ′ =⇒ µR⊆(µ′)R
(Lemma 2.10 in Ref. [1]) is reduced to µ < µ′ =⇒ µR⊂(µ′)R. Reversely, assume µR⊂(µ′)R but µ 6< µ′. Then,
µR∩ (µ′)Rc = (µ ·¬µ′)R = ∅ but µ ·¬µ′ 6= 0, which is contradictory since µ ·¬µ′ ∈ [∅]FD while [∅]FD = {0}. Therefore,
µR⊂(µ′)R ⇐⇒ µ < µ′.
Note that the occurrence of degenerate GCL is not as rare as one might have anticipated. For instance, by removing
the attributes a, b and d from F (G,M) in Table I, where M reduces to {c, e}, one will end up with nF = 2|M | = 4. As
is depicted in Fig. 4, the resultant degenerate GCL then comprises 24 nodes embedded in the original one, in which
1η = ce + c¬e + ¬ce + ¬c¬e ≡ 1 and 0ρ = (¬c + ¬e)(¬c + e)(c + ¬e)(c + e) ≡ 0. However, still more instructive is
that to each formal context one may associate a degenerate formal context, which exhibits all the attribute freedom
and can thus serve as the reference context for analysing the re-parametrisation for the general concept lattice.
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5. DISCUSSION
One has demonstrated in this paper the merits of GCL with two insightful features, which are the generality and
the tractability. For the generality feature, it is shown that the GCL incorporates the conventional FCL and RSL
from both the perspectives of lattice structure and of logic content. From the lattice-structure perspective, the GCL
furnishes a comprehensive categorisation for whatever distinctive object classes (general extents) based on F (G,M),
where every attribute in M∗ essentially pertains to a definite general intent, cf. Proposition 2.1. The GCL turns
out to be the foundation of various generalised concept lattices (Proposition 2.2) such as the generalised versions
of the FCL and RSL. In practice, all the nodes of the FCL and the RSL are identifiable on the GCL, as can be
explicitly worked out in Fig. 2 and 3. From the logic-content perspective, the logic implication extracted from the
GCL is concerned with the implication relations of the type µ1 → µ2 (µ1, µ2 ∈M∗) where the FCL- and RSL- based
implications emerge as particular cases due to Eq. (12).
For the tractability feature, both constructing the lattice structure and implementing the logic content are tractable.
To construct the lattice, the GCL develops a Hasse diagram of 2nF nodes, where each node is referred to as a general
concept comprising a distinct 2-tuple given in terms of general extent and general intent. The 2nF general extents
appear to be all possible unions of the smallest subsets discernible by the formal context, see Proposition 3.5 in Ref. [1],
hence, no additional effort is needed for selecting them out. The general intents are 2nF disjoint closed sub-intervals
of M∗ (Proposition 2.1, Corollary 4.4) with the constant cardinality 2rank(M)−nF . The expression of a general
concept is stated as (X, [X]F ), where [X]F = [η(X), ρ(X)], namely, η(X) and ρ(X) are respectively the lower and
upper bounds of [X]F , see Proposition 2.1. The construction of GCL is as tractable as listing out the formal
context in an arbitray order since it is fully characterised by means of the η-representation Υη (or ρ-representation
Υρ, see Definition 3.4), which can be completed by a single glance of the formal context, see Proposition 3.1. All
the general concepts can then be read out on-demand from Υη (Υρ). Note that based on Proposition 3.3 any of
the components in the triplet (X, ρ(X), η(X)) will determine the other two, as can be illustrated by means of simple
binary masks, see Eq. (10).
In determining the logic content, the GCL suggests to implement the implication relations via the entailment of
the lower bound property. Note that any object set carrying a definite property should be categorised into a definite
general extent because every attribute in M∗ essentially belongs to a definite general intent (Proposition 2.1). Such
an implementation is tractable since the single formula ∀µ ∈ M∗ µ → µ · 1η (Proposition 4.7) suffices to present
all the rules of informative implication where 1η is the contextual truth obtained by summing all the components of
the η-representation (Definition 3.4). Conjugately, the formula can be restated as ∀µ ∈ M∗ µ + 0ρ → µ with the
contextual falsity 0ρ ≡ ¬1η, which turns out to implement the implication relations via the entailment of the upper
bound property. Note that either of the formulas
{
µ →µ·1η
µ+0ρ →µ is capable of determining all the implication relations
based on the formal context, including those which could be deduced from the FCL and RSL since both A
fcl→ B and
A
rsl→ B can be interpreted as particular cases for µ1 → µ2 by Eq. (12). On the other hand,
{
A
fcl→B
A
rsl→B
can by no means
generate all the possible implications from the formal context. Obviously, an expression like “¬e → a + ¬b¬d” in
Eq. (14) can be identified neither with A
fcl→ B nor with A rsl→ B.
The logic reasoning based on the GCL is in fact rather intuitive. All the attributes [X]F possessed by the same
object class X are regarded as equivalent. For any µ ∈M∗, there is a bi-conditional equivalence ∀ν ∈ [µR]F µ↔ ν that
corresponds to the T1-rules (Lemma 4.6) from which one may determine all the rules by incorporating tautologies.
While the explicit object reference is ignored here, logic relations only refer to the contextual Venn diagram VFM ,
µ1 → µ2 gets its interpretation via µR1 ⊆ µR2 . In general, the set relation between µR1 and µR2 suggests an ordering
on VFM that further determines whether µ1 → µ2 is an allowable implication, see Eq. (13) also cf. Proposition 3.14 in
Ref. [1]. Note that any attribute in effect serves as a logic statement that asserts property on a definite subject. In
particular, the attribute 1η = 1
F
η = 1η(VFM ) exhibits a logic condition that governs the rules of implication according
to VFM . Hence, every single attribute enters as a logic statement that asserts property and then can be employed
as a logic condition by means of 1η(V lcM ). The idea to deal with the statements of pure attribute type then brings
about a simplified algebraically manipulable reasoning called the primary deduction system [18] where the logical
OR, AND, NOT and implication among statements can be realised by the Boolean disjunction, conjunction and
negation operators among attributes. Indeed, the primary deduction system readily suffices to provide an efficient
reasoning tool that leads to non-trivial applications, e.g. solving certain well-known puzzles. Moreover, the rules of
classical logic are found to be true in the primary deduction system since the Hilbert axioms in Ref. [19] all appear
to be manifestly valid. It should however be remarked that the primary deduction system with pure attribute-type
statements could not be satisfactory and is coined to be na¨ıve as it contradicts one’s intuitions, Ref. [20] thus strives to
incorporate novel syntax in order to resolve such counterintuitive issue. Another point is that the primary deduction
system is not expressive enough, as opposed to the conventional reasoning process, therefore, one has to look forward
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further to a comprehensive algebraically manipulable deduction [21].
In addition, the degenerate formal context (Proposition 4.8) describes a mathematical limit at which the number
of object classes discernible by the formal context is exhausted. Notably, the degenerate formal context gives rise
to a degenerate GCL in which the condition ρ(X) = η(X) reduces every general intent into one sole member of
M∗ (Corollary 4.4). The contextual Venn diagram for a degenerate formal context FD in fact coincides with the
conventional Venn diagram, say VFDM = VM , by means of 1FDη = 1. Indeed, the implication formula (Proposition 4.7),
when applying to the degenerate GCL, concludes that ∀µ ∈ M∗ µ → µ which proposes no interesting implications
and thus becomes less appealing as a practical categorisation. Nevertheless, the degenerate formal context can serve
as theoretical referential system. To each formal context, a referential context can be designed to provide a basis
convention, by revealing the freedom of the generalised attribute system as was stated in Eq. (8). In practice, the
referential context FD(G∪Gf ,M) is a degenerate formal context by appending Gf to F (G,M), a set of rank(M)−nF
fictitious objects (hence, nFD = rank(M)), as a means to expose the attribute freedom corresponding to the properties
not carried by the existing objects. In Ref. [18], it will be shown the referential context is instructive to illustrate the
extensive structure of GCL. Moreover, FD(G ∪ Gf ,M) also provides a very convenient framework above which one
may study the equivalent classes of formal context.
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